Third, generals routinely ask for more troops when they take over a command, not simply because they are needed but as a bureaucratic tactic to shift blame in case they are not able to achieve the mission. For example, after the Chinese intervened in Korea in 1950, Gen. Douglas MacArthur asked President Harry Truman to double the number of American troops to prevent the U.S. forces from being driven off the Korean peninsula. But Gen. Matthew Ridgway, who took over after MacArthur was fired, stabilized the situation at the 38th Parallel without a new influx of troops.
Similarly, after the Tet Offensive, Gen. William Westmoreland wanted nearly 200,000 more troops on top of the 500,000 already in South Vietnam. His successor, Gen. Creighton Abrams, stabilized the situation militarily even after the U.S. began withdrawing troops. This allowed President Richard Nixon to sign a peace treaty in 1973.
President Obama and his national security team are right to take a deliberative approach in readapting U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in the wake of that country's disastrous presidential elections in August. While time is not on our side, Mr. Obama would be well advised to keep these considerations in mind before he orders the second troop escalation this year.
