Vance's death comes as a vigorous debate is under way in Washington over whether more U.S. military effort or more U.S. development assistance - or more of both - is necessary to combat the growing power of the Taliban and al-Qaida in the tribal belt.
Vice President-elect Joe Biden is the author of legislation that calls for $15 billion in civilian assistance over the next decade for Pakistan, a significant increase over the level of U.S. civilian aid under the Bush administration.
Despite the questions about the effectiveness of the aid to the tribal region, there was a feeling in Washington that such assistance had to be tried, said Craig Cohen, the author of a study on U.S. and Pakistan relations at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
"There is a sentiment that we need to be out there, but we know its danger," Cohen said. "There's a belief we want to do something more than military. We need an aid presence."
In Vance's case, that presence was quiet, yet still conspicuous. To blend in, he at times wore a shalwar kameez, the long tunic and baggy pants that Pakistani men commonly wear.
But there was barely rudimentary security at the office where he worked: no closed-circuit cameras and no real system of identifying visitors before they entered, associates said. It appeared his assailants were waiting for him, an American colleague said.
Seven spent bullet cartridges were recovered from the scene of his shooting, near the American Club, a social gathering place.
The brazen killing of such an experienced aid worker stunned U.S. and Pakistani officials in Peshawar but did not surprise some of them.
Security had collapsed to such an extent in the city, and the anti-American sentiment had become so high that U.S. officials and aid workers were often kept in "lock down" by the U.S. Consulate, meaning they had to work at home, or get permission from the consulate security officer to move from their home to the office.
"Ever since the Taliban started targeted assassinations against politicians a few months ago, it was almost inevitable that they would target U.S. aid efforts," said Joshua White, a research fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a specialist in Pakistan.
Some Pakistanis hired for USAID projects were driving into the tribal areas in vehicles "Taliban-style," meaning in double-cabin pickups that are the Taliban signature vehicles and with only light security, White said. But the workers knew this was exceedingly risky and could come to a bitter end, he said.
