Ever since 9/11, the nightmare scenario for American security has been the possibility that terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons.
I've just come back from the place where, in theory, that might happen: Pakistan, a country that is thought to have about 50 nuclear warheads, where al-Qaida, the Taliban and other jihadis have established a substantial foothold.
The assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the continuing instability in her country force us to ask a terrifying question: Could Pakistan's Islamic extremists seize a nuke or steal the fissile material for a dirty bomb?
Back in November, U.S. intelligence agencies assessed that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was safe. The situation has deteriorated sharply since then. Are those weapons safe?
To search for answers, I visited a top security official responsible for the safety of Pakistan's nuclear program, two days after the death of Ms. Bhutto.
The official, a military general, declined to be identified because of the sensitive nature of his job. For two hours, using a slide presentation, he outlined a multilayered system of safeguards for weapons and materiel, along with an elaborate system of personnel checks for scientists and workers, designed to weed out any militancy or connection with terrorist elements.
The Nuclear Command Authority, made up of the president and prime minister, along with senior Cabinet members and military officials, controls the nukes and would decide on any deployment. The Personnel Reliability Program focuses on the most sensitive employees of the system, even after they leave it, including background checks and psychological testing. "There is no way a group of terrorists could penetrate our strategic facilities," said the security official.
The system was set up in 1999, after Pakistan's first detonation of a nuclear weapon in 1998; it was tightened after the nuclear scandal perpetrated by the father of the Pakistani bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who sold nuclear weapons designs and components to Iran, North Korea and Libya in the 1980s and 1990s. Many experts believe senior Pakistani military and intelligence officials were complicit.
In today's uncertain Pakistani political climate, could another scientist provide nuclear material to Islamists? Could Islamist sympathizers within the military evade the scrutiny of the security system? The security official insisted that there would never be a repetition of the Khan.
