ONCE A prosperous kingdom, an international, and a regional power, today's Saudi Arabia looks a little ragged.
With mounting internal and external pressures, the ruling elite's hold on power has been spread thin.
Not only has Saudi per capita income plummeted from a staggering $28,600 in 1981 to $6,800 last year, but its worth as a regional power and a reliable ally is being increasingly questioned, even challenged.
Following Sept. 11, the Bush administration has been pressed to begin drafting alternatives to Saudi oil. After all, 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi and only 16 percent of Saudis have a favorable view of America.
Not surprisingly, Americans have been working hard at stabilizing their relationship with Russia, which they hope will, in the near future, supply some of the energy currently imported from Saudi Arabia. The Russian oil sector is a lot like the United Kingdom's (the Russian government has limited power over how Russian oil companies allocate their sales or investments) - something Americans understand and can work with. On the contrary, the nationalized oil industry of Saudi Arabia is hardly convincing to the proponents of laissez faire.
Cause for less alarm was the recent visit by Walter Kansteiner, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, to Nigeria and Angola: the two largest oil producers in sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, according to Mr. Kansteiner, pursuing the African alternative is "undeniably" in the United States' national strategic interest.
Russia and sub-Saharan Africa are far less hostile to U.S. presence than is Saudi Arabia. According to a recent nationwide survey, 65 percent of Russians feel "good" or "very good" about the United States. The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies has found West Africa to be "receptive to American presence."
But America is not only distancing itself from the Saudi oil, it is also challenging the Saudis over political alignment in the region. Thus far, Crown Prince Abdullah has been less than successful in his attempts to alter the Bush stance on the Middle East conflict. His peace proposal, albeit an effort appreciated by policymakers in Washington, did little to change the U.S. president's staunch support for Israel's right to self-defense. What's worse, the Abdullah plan was poorly received even in some of the other Arab states.
