THE STANDOFF and subsequent agreement between the United States and North Korea is a vivid reminder that procrastination is dangerous and expensive when dealing with would-be nuclear regimes. The world had suspected for a decade that the dictatorship of Kim Il Sung was secretly developing the capacity to build a nuclear weapon. But only after the evidence became overwhelming, and the possession of such weapons a real threat, did the United States and others begin to develop a serious response.
The most prominent candidate for the next proliferation crisis is Iran. But, because Iran's nuclear program is still extremely small and U.S. leverage is at its peak, there is a good chance of averting a full-blown crisis -- if the U.S. government acts now, with the same determination that was shown in the talks with North Korea.
When Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci sat down with the North Korean negotiator, he had only a few cards to play. North Korea probably already had the makings of one or more bombs, and its conventional military threat to South Korea made coercion an excessively risky and probably unworkable option. In the end, Mr. Gallucci got the best deal he could. Rather than quibble about the terms, we should profit from the experience so we have a better hand to play the next time.
